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Abstract
This paper studies environmental taxation in a Mirrlees setting when energy, a polluting
good, is used both as a factor of production and a nal consumption good. The model
is calibrated for the Czech economy. We study two di¤erent tax systems. Both consider
a non-linear income tax but the rst one considers a linear energy tax, while the second
one allows for a non-linear taxation of energy. We show that: (i) householdsenergy
consumption should be subsidized except if the environmental external costs of energy
consumption are su¢ ciently high (ii) The subsidy applied to energy consumption should
decrease with income.
JEL classication: H21; H23.
Keywords: energy tax, Pigouvian tax, redistributive concerns.
1 Introduction
In the recent years, the undesired redistributive consequences of energy taxes has been
studied in several theoretical and empirical papers. This paper is in the continuation of
the previous empirical studies by Cremer and al. (2003, 2010 and 2012).
We model an open economy with three factors of production and two categories of
consumption goods. The factors of production are labor, capital, and energy. Labor
is homogeneous in e¢ ciency units, but di¤erent individual types have di¤erent endow-
ments of e¢ ciency units. All workers are immobile and no labor is either exported
or imported. Capital inputs are rented from outside so that all capital incomes go to
foreigners; energy inputs are also imported.1 Emissions come from two sources: the
use of energy input on the production side, and the consumption of one category of nal
goods on the consumption side (designated as polluting goods). The specic emissions
we are concerned with are carbon emissions (dioxide and monoxide). The production
process consists of two stages. First, a constant returns to scale production technology
uses the three inputs to produce a general-purposeoutput. Second, a linear technol-
ogy transforms the output into the two categories of consumption goods at constant
marginal (equal to average) costs. The rst-stage production function is nested CES.
Consumerspreferences are also nested CES, being a function of labor and the two nal
goods.
The model is calibrated for the Czech economy on the basis of the data from EU
KLEMS database (March 2008 edition) for the production sector and on micro-data
from Living Conditions 2006survey for the household sector
We identify four groups of households who di¤er not only in earning abilities but also
in tastes. The segmentation is made in two ways. In the rst one households groups are
1There are two reasons for assuming capital is rented from outside. One, we do not have data on
holdings of capital by di¤erent types of workers. Second, taxation of capital in a static setting is not an
interesting question. The similar assumption on energy inputs is for simplicity in exposition and of no
relevant consequence.
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identied as Low skilled in services, Low skilled crafts, Quite skilledand High
skilled. This segmentation is similar to the segmentation used for France in Cremer
and & al. (2003, 2010) and US in Cremer and & al. (2011) and allows comparison
with these studies. In the second one, the segmentation is based on total gross earnings
earned by all economic-active persons in a family.2 The rst group includes households
that earned 10% lowest total earnings [poor ], the second one cover the households with
10% to 50% lowest earnings [semi-poor ], and the third one with 50% to 90% [semi-
reach], while the last, fourth, group describes the households with the top 10% highest
gross earnings [reach]. Because we focus on the redistributive consequences of energy
taxation, this last segmentation of households is more relevant than the former one.3
We consider two values for the marginal social damage of emissions. The rst value
corresponds to the case in which there is no externality ( = 0), the second is calculated
in such a way that the rst best Pigouvian tax is equal to 10% of energy price.
We model the behavior of the government as one of setting optimal tax policies in
light of the constraints that it faces. We use an iso-elastic social welfare function for this
purpose. Moreover, we consider two values of an inequality aversion index that dictates
the desired degree of redistribution in the economy. Two tax regimes are analyzed, both
of them are formed around a general tax schedule. in the rst one the polluting good
tax is linear while it is non-linear in the second one. The paper is organized as follows:
the second section describes the model, the section 3 is devoted to the data description,
the fourth shows how is performed the calibration and nally the last section gives and
comments the results.
2Households without any revenue from labor are excluded from our analysis (such units include
households of retired persons, unemployed, disabled).
3We however highlight that households in which all its members are economically non-active are not
included in the analysis.
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2 The model
This model is based on Cremer and al.s (2010). To make this paper self-contained, we
rst review its main features.4
Consider an open economy wherein people consume two produced goods: a compos-
ite consumption good, x; and energy, y. The composite consumption good is produced
domestically using energy inputs, D, capital, K, and labor, L. Energy, whether used
as a consumption good or as a factor input, is imported from overseas. Capital services
and energy inputs are imported at constant world prices of r and pD. Labor is supplied
domestically. All imports are nanced through exports of the portion of the general
output that is not consumed domestically. Energy, both as a consumption good and
factor input, is polluting; the composite consumption good is not.
Consumers have heterogeneous preferences. Di¤erent groups of individuals having
di¤erent productivity levels and di¤erent tastes are considered in the model. Denote a
persons type by j, his productivity factor by nj , and the proportion of people of type j
in the economy by j (where the population size is normalized at one). Preferences of
a j-type person is represented by an utility function that depend on his consumption of
non-polluting goods, xj ; consumption of polluting goods, yj , labor supply, Lj , and the
total level of emissions in the atmosphere, E 
4P
j=1
jyj +D. 5. This utility function is
denoted,
fj = U(x; y; Lj ; j)  E; j = 1; 2; 3; 4: (1)
where j reects the taste parameter. 6
The production process consists of two stages. First, a constant returns to scale
production technology uses three inputs to produce a general-purpose output, O.
4For more details, see Cremer et al. (1998, 2003 and 2010).
5Note that population size is normalized to 1, E is therefore the total level of energy consumption
or emissions in the economy.
6Note that the emissions enter the utility function lineraly, therefore the marginal desutility of
emissions, , is assumed to be constant.
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Second, a linear technology transforms the output into the two categories of consumption
goods, x and y, at constant marginal (equal to average) costs. The production function
is given by,
O = F (L;K;D)
where,
L =
4X
j=1
jnjLj :7
The government is interested in designing an optimal tax system consisting of a
general income tax, and taxes on energy as a consumption good and as an intermediate
good. The design of an optimal tax structures must be based on some underlying social
welfare function. For this purpose, we will use an iso-elastic social welfare function of
the form
W =
1
1  
4X
j=1
j(fj)1   6= 1 and 0   <1; (2)
where  is the inequality aversion index. The higher is  the more the society values
equality.8
The feasibility of a particular tax instrument is determined by the information that
is available to the tax administration. We consider here that the government does not
observe productivities and tastes but that the individual incomes are known by the
tax administration. This means that a general income tax is feasible. In practice the
government is not able to observe individuals purchases of goods and services and is thus
constrained to apply linear commodity tax. This situation is analyzed in a rst version
of our model. A second version considers that consumption levels are known at an
7As di¤erent types of people have di¤erent productivities, labor is an heterogeneous factor of produc-
tion. When a j-type person with productivity nj works for Lj hours, his e¤ective labor is njLj resulting
in aggregate supply
P4
j=1 
jnjLj . Equating this with aggregate demand gives L =
4X
j=1
jnjLj :
8As is well-known,  = 0 implies a utilitarian social welfare function and  !1 a Rawlsian. When
 = 1; the social welfare function is given by W =
P4
j=1 
j ln(fj):
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individual level (i.e. who buys how much) and consequently that non-linear commodity
taxation is feasible.
2.1 Linear commodity taxes
Under linear commodity taxation, all consumers face the same commodity prices. The
social welfare function (2) must thus be written as a function of the prices of goods.
Denote cj the after-tax income (outlay) of a j-type household, p and q the consumer
prices of x and y respectively. Maximizing, the utility function (1) with respect to the
budget constraint
pxj + qyj = cj ;
we obtain the demand functions for xj and yj as xj = x
 
p; q; cj ; j

and yj = y
 
p; q; cj ; j

.
Substituting these equations in the j-type person utility function (1), we have
V

p; q; cj ;
Ij
wnj
; j

= U

x
 
p; q; cj ; j

;y
 
p; q; cj ; j

;
Ij
wnj
; j

;
where9
Ij = wjLj = wnjLj :
We have four feasible tax instruments in our model: two commodity taxes, an input
tax and an income tax. As the demand functions for goods and the labor supply function
are all homogeneous of degree zero, there is no loss of generality when setting one tax
rate to zero. Since energy consumption creates an externality we choose to impose a
zero tax on non-energy goods.
The optimal tax structure is derived as the solution to
max
q;cj ;Ij ;K;D;w
1
1  
4X
j=1
j
24V p; q; cj ; Ij
wnj
; j

  
4X
j=1
jy
 
p; q; cj ; j
  D
351  (3)
9wj  wnj is individual js wage rate; so w represent the price of 1 unit of e¤ective labor.
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under the resource constraint,
O (L;K;D) 
4X
j=1
j

x

p; q; cj ;
Ij
wnj
; j

+ y

p; q; cj ;
Ij
wnj
; j

 rK pDD  R  0;
(4)
the incentive compatibility constraints,
V

p; q; cj ;
Ij
wnj
; j

 V

p; q; ck;
Ik
wnj
; j

; (5)
the endogeneity of wage condition,
w  OL (L;K;D) = 0; (6)
with
L =
4X
j=1
jnjLj =
4X
j=1
j
Ij
w
:
It can be shown analytically that rst, the constraint (6) is always binding, and
second, that the optimal tax on energy input is Pigouvian and equal to its marginal
social damage of emissions. The optimal tax on the consumption of energy, on the other
hand, is generally di¤erent from its Pigouvian level (see appendix in Cremer and al.s
(2013)).
2.2 Non linear commodity taxes
The optimal tax structure when individual purchases are not observable is the solution
to,
max
xj ;yj ;Ij ;D;K;w
1
1  
4X
j=1
j
24U xj ; yj ; Ij
wnj
; j

  
4X
j=1
jyj   D
351  (7)
under the resource constraint,
O(L;K;D) 
24 4X
j=1
j
 
xj + yj

+ rK +D +R
35  0; (8)
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the incentive compatibility constraints,
U

xj ; yj ;
Ij
wnj
; j

 U

xk; yk;
Ik
wnj
; j

j 6= k; (9)
the endogeneity of wage condition,
w  OL (L;K;D) = 0; (10)
with
L =
4X
j=1
jnjLj =
4X
j=1
j
Ij
w
:
3 Data Description
3.1 Data Sources
Two sources of data are used in our tax model of the Czech economy.
The production side is described by macroeconomic data from the EU KLEMS
database (March 2008 edition)10 . The production in the model is specically calibrated
on data for the years 1995 and 2005.
A micro-data from Living Conditions 2006survey is used to describe incomes and
expenditures of the household sector. This survey has been conducted by the Czech
Statistical O¢ ce as a national module of the EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on
Income and Living Conditions) survey project. 11 12
10 In the time of running our model, EU KLEM (March 2008 release) was the latest available dataset
that provided volume indices for intermediate energy inputs for the Czech Republic that we use in our
calibration process. The volume indices are available until 2005.
11The EU-SILC is an instrument aiming at collecting timely and comparable both cross-sectional and
longitudinal data on income, economic activity, poverty and living conditions (CSO 2014). The SILC
survey consists of three questionnaires: the household instrument contains information on housing, con-
sumer durables or nancial situation of the, family social benets or so, the personal questionnaire asks
each household member aged 16 years or over for information on labour status and employment, per-
sonal income and selected biographical information and health, and the dwelling questionnaire records
demographic characteristics of dwelling and composition of the household. The EU-SILC has the form
of compulsory data collection in all EU Member States and is guided by the European legislation
(framework Regulation (EC) 1177/2003 and its implementing Commission regulations).
12An alternative data source complied by Czech Statistical o¢ ce to describe the household sector in
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Information on economic activity in EU-SILC includes data on earnings and working
hours for each household member that we need to describe household labour supply and
labour incomes. Since all incomes are reported for the previous year, we base our model
on the SILC 2006 survey to match household data with data on production sector.
Despite the fact the EU-SILC does not aim at recording expenditures, except housing
expenditures, the Czech SILC allows disaggregating the housing expenditures further
on expenditures on electricity, gas, district heating, hot water, and solid fuels that we
use in our model. The Czech-SILC records the monthly payments for energy in a month
of the interview was conducted. The amount that given household should pay monthly
is set by the utility according to the consumption in the previous year. The recorded
amount in the Czech SILC therefore does not reect household energy consumption of
the year of surveying, but it rather indicates its consumption in the previous year. Using
the Czech SILC for the year 2006 thus provides consistent source of income, labour and
energy expenditure data with production data based on KLEMS 2005.
3.2 Sample descriptive statistics
In total, the Czech SILC 2006 contains information for 7,483 dwellings and 17,830
individuals. The total number of dwellings selected in each region is proportional to
regions size. The response rate is 76%. 13
In order to link our tax model to data, we need to restrict our sample to only
those units who are active on the labour market. We thus rst delete households with
our model Household Budget Survey records expenditures in more detail, it does not however record
working hours and record wage income for the head and spouse separately only (incomes of others are
recorded together).
13The SILC survey was carried out on the whole territory of the Czech Republic during February and
April 2006. In total 5,750 new dwellings entered the survey and 4,406 dwellings were revisited. Getting
75.8 % response rate, 7,483 dwellings are recorded in the nal sample.
The Czech-SILC sample is obtained by applying a two-stage probability sampling scheme on each of
the 14 administrative NUT3-level regions independently. Municipality size was used as an additional
stratication variable. Dwellings are thus selected using the two-stage design small geographical areas
are rst sampled as primary sampling units with probability proportional to their size, at the second
stage, ten dwellings are sampled in each sampled CEU (CSO 2006).
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no expenditures on energy (N=28, 0.37%). Then we removed the households which
gets their income mainly outside of labour market (that is, if total gross earnings of
all economic active persons in a family are lower than 50% of total gross incomes of
the family). Such households present families with non-economic active persons, such
as households of retired or unemployed (N=3,780, 50.5%). Last, we delete households
with the maximal personal earnings earned by all household members are lower than
the minimal wage set by the government. Although such households get most of their
incomes from their labour, these labour incomes are in most cases earned irregularly for
occasional job. These job incomes are also very small in absolute magnitude (mean of
94,000 CZK vs. 349,000 CZK for the whole restricted sample) that indicates on quite
income poor families (with annual mean of 115,000 CZK vs. 316,872 CZK for the whole
restricted sample). There are 99 such dwellings (1.3%) that we exclude from our sample.
Our cleaning results in the restricted sample that provides information in total for 3,595
dwellings and 10,299 individuals. Our tax model is just built around this sample.
The restricted sample used in our model consists of households with some economic-
active persons earning signicant share at labour market on total incomes of their family.
Table 1 describes statistics for key socio-demographic variables, expenditures, and vari-
ables linked to labour market. All statistics are weighted by households proportion in
total Czech population; the SILC variable PKOEF is used to weight our data properly.
On average, there are almost 3 persons living in the dwelling [OSOB], with 1.7
economic active persons [EA] and 0.8 children [DETI]. About a half of households has
at least one child.
Average annual gross incomes [HPRIJMY ] are 417,526 CZK (e14,020), annual net
incomes [CP_PRIJ ] are 327,372 CZK (e10,993). About 48% of households receive
social allowances to support nancially their children with average bonus of 4,610 CZK
a year [BONUSch], which corresponds to 1.1% of average gross incomes. This bonus
is provided in a form of a refundable tax credit of 6,000 CZK per one child and year (is
9
provided as a benet if the bonus exceeds calculated personal income tax); about 23%
of households in our sample receive 6,000 CZK just for one child, 22% get 12,000 CZK
for two children, and 3.5% get up to three 30,000 CZK.
Annual gross earning received by all household members [Wall] are, on average,
361,496 CZK, and on average these earnings represent 87% of total annual gross incomes
of given household [wage_sh]. In more than half dwellings the gross earnings exceed
91% of total household incomes, and there are 18% of household that receives income
from labour only.
Average monthly housing costs are about 4,000 CZK [NAKLADY ], out of it 2,587
CZK households spent on energy for heating, powering appliances, cooking and lighting.
Mean annual expenditures on energy [ENERGY ] represent about 10% of total net
incomes, in absolute terms about 31,000 CZK.
Mean hourly wage rate of the head [wrate1] is 118 CZK (e4.0), while the spouse
earned on average 88 CZK per an hour (e3.0) [wrate2]. Maximal wage rate among
all wage rates earned by each family member is 119 CZK [Wratemax], mean of means
of all wage rate across economic active family members is 109 CZK [Wratemean].
Households worked on average 3,442 hours a year [HOURS] and 49% of total time
endowment [HOURS_sh] that we dene by 16 hours a day over 5 working days a week
and for 52 weeks a year (that is 4,160 hours per each working person earned in the year
2005 certain wage).
3.3 Computation of household labour tax payments
TAX is computed personal income tax payments and obligatory contributions to social
and health insurance that given household would pay if the tax system rules as enforced
in the year 2005 were followed. Specically, we follow personal income tax system with
three tax bands (109,200 CZK; 218,400 CZK; and 331,200 CZK) and four PIT rates
(12%, 19%, 25%, and 32%). Tax deductibles of 38,040 CZK per each tax payer in the
10
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the reduced Czech SILC-2006 sample, N=3,595.
Variable Variable description Type Mean s.d. Min Max
Socio-demographics
OSOB number of household members count 2.89 28.16 1 9
EA number of economic active persons count 1.73 17.68 0 4
DETI number of children count 0.77 21.86 0 5
childless =1 if there is no child dummy 0.52 11.85 0 1
BONUSCH social allowances for children, in CZK per year continuous 4 610 131 151 0 30 000
CP_PRIJ total household next incomes, in CZK per year continuous 327 372 3 707 917 79 379 1 630 359
HPRIJMY total household gross incomes, in CZK peryear continuous 417 526 5 253 133 98 350 2 597 500
Household expenditures
NAKLADY housing costs, in CZK per month continuous 4 073 38 841 563 22 876
ELEKTR monthly expenditures on electricity, in CZK continuous 1 052 15 733 0 9 000
PLYN monthly expenditures on gas, in CZK continuous 731 22 029 0 5 800
UT monthly expenditures on district heating, CZK continuous 610 18 038 0 5 420
PALIVA monthly expenditures on heating fuels, in CZK continuous 193 10 450 0 4 583
ENERGY energy expenditures, in CZK per year continuous 31 043 302 743 3 684 117 108
REST household expenditures on the rest (non-energy) goods, CZK per year continuous 296 329 3 630 746 19 632 1 579 959
Labour supply and earnings
Wall annual gross earnings from labour of allhousehold members, in CZK continuous 361 496 5 092 600 96 300 2 597 500
TAX annual tax on personal income from labour, inCZK continuous 85 893 2 001 048 -3 823 1 078 474
Wallmax maximal annual wage earnings out of allworking person in the household, in CZK continuous 256 137 3 598 248 96 300 2 597 500
wage_sh share of earnings from labour (from all workingpersons) on total gross incomes of a household share 0.86 3.54 0.50 1
wrate1 hourly wage rate of the head, in CZK Continuous(N=3,238) 118 4 281 26.4 7 418
wrate2 hourly wage rate of the (female) spouse, in CZK Continuous(N=1,722) 88 1 168 25.9 750
wratemax maximal hourly wage rate out of all workingpersons in the household, in CZK continuous 119 4 117 0 7 418
wratemean average hourly wage rate out of all workingpersons in the household, in CZK continuous 109 3 620 0 6 487
HOURS working hours per year of all working persons hours 3 442 37 172 0 10 400
HOURS_sh
share of working hours on total time
endowment of all working persons in a
household (52weeks x 5days x 16hours)
share 0.49 2.79 0 1.13
Note: To translate CZK in Euro, the average exchange rate in 2006 can be used: 29.78 Czech crown per 1 Euro.
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family and tax bonus linked to children [BONUSch] of 6,000 CZK per a dependent
child, with 30,000 CZK per year set as the maximum, are applied.
If a couple is married and has at least one dependent child, then joint taxation of
couples is allowed, i.e. gross earnings are sum up and the tax bands are doubled, keeping
the tax rates.
Obligatory payment to social and health insurance are computed as 15% of gross
earnings.
A routine in SAS was programmed to compute household-specic taxes paid from
labour earning. The TAX is computed for each person in a family who received any
regular labour income in the year 2005, that is, TAX is a sum of TAX payments we
derived for each person in a family.
Marginal tax rate, tau, is dened as the largest marginal tax we derived for the head
and his spouse. Fixed part of the tax payment [GG] is a di¤erence between the marginal
tax rate multiplied by all gross earnings from labour and TAX, this part might get both
positive or negative values, i.e.
GG = tau Wall   TAX:
Other incomes, for instance social allowances [MM], are then dened as total net
incomes minus total net earnings minus the xed part of the labour tax payments, i.e.
MM = CP_PRIJ   (1  tau) Wall  GG:
The identity holds, that is the sum of expenditures on energy and non-energy equals
to the sum of total net earnings, other incomes, and Fixed part of the tax payment, i.e.
(ENERGY +REST ) = (GG+MM + net_Wall):
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Table 2: Definition of the segments based on working profession
Name Description ISCO code No.
observations
ISCO-1 service workers 5,6 340 (10%)
ISCO-2 no skilled crafts 7,8,9 1,520 (43%)
ISCO-3 quite skilled - technicians and skilled clerks 3,4 1,122 (32%)
ISCO-4 high skilled - managers and professionals 1,2 545 (15%)
3.4 Denition and data for household groups
In this paper, we analyse the optimal tax for two distinct groups of household seg-
ments14. First denition follows the household segmentation based on working profes-
sion, as dened by ISCO codes, following Cremer and al. (2003). Specically, we dene
four segments according to working profession classied by ISCO codes of the family
member with the largest earnings, as described in Table 2. There are about 10% of
service workers, 43% no skilled, 32% intermediate skilled and remaining 15% of high
skilled households.
Descriptive statistics for the four household segments are displayed in table 3. The
household composition of the four segments, on average, does not di¤er much. Total
incomes, gross earnings are monotonically increasing along the four groups. The rst
three groups spent almost same amount on energy bills (about 30,000 CZK a year), the
high skilled segment pays for energy about 15% more. Higher variation is in non-energy
expenditures; low skilled spent less than two third and quite skilled spent about three
thirds of what high skilled spent.
About 90% of the heads are earning money for their job and there are about half
of spouses that are also receiving incomes from working. The highest share of working
14 In both groups, households with all members taht are not economically active, such as with retired
persons, are excluded, and hence are not considered in our analysis.
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heads and spouses appear in the high skilled (92% and 56%), followed by low skilled
crafts (ISCO-2), the households containing low skilled persons working in services work
the least (84% and 42%).
On average, total hours spent on work do not vary much across the four groups
and the working hours range between 3,374 to 3,536 hours a year. Time spent in work,
as the share on total time endowment of all persons receiving earnings, does not vary
either; it is about 50%, that is equivalent of 8 hours a day per 5 days a week and 52
weeks a year. Only highly skilled work more, but their share is only about 4% larger
than the shares in remaining groups.
Households with more skilled persons get, however, signicantly larger hourly wage
rates. Average hourly wage rate of the heads is same in both low skilled segments, about
94 CZK, while the heads in the quite skilled households earned 121 CZK and in the high
skilled earned even 187 CZK an hour, on average. The hourly wage rate of the spouses
is lower than the wage rate of their heads and their wage rates are also increasing across
working skills; the rate is about 70 CZK in ISCO-1 and ISCO-2 group, and reaches 112
CZK in ISCO-4.
The segmentation of households by ISCO codes is similar to the segmentation used
for France in Cremer and & al. (2003, 2010) and US in Cremer and & al. (2011) and
allows comparison with these studies. Because we have individual data at our disposal,
we are able here to consider many di¤erent denitions of households segments. As we
focus on the redistributive consequences of energy taxation, it seems to be relevant to
use households segments based on total gross earnings earned by all economic-active
persons in a family. We dene again four groups; rst group includes households that
earned 10% lowest total earnings [poor ], the second one cover the households with 10%
to 50% lowest earnings [semi-poor ], and the third one with 50% to 90% [semi-reach],
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the four segments defined by the occupation.
ISCO-1
[low skilled in
services]
ISCO-2
[low skilled
crafts]
ISCO-3
[quite skilled]
ISCO-4
[high skilled]
share share in the sample 0.10 0.43 0.32 0.15
OSOB household members 2.78 3.00 2.75 2.90
DETI number of children 0.69 0.79 0.73 0.90
EA number of economic active persons 1.72 1.75 1.75 1.72
CP_PRIJ net incomes, CZK a year 283 322 286 530 339 594 432 496
ENERGY energy expenditures, CZK a year 30 620 30 079 30 400 34 853
REST non-energy expenditures, CZK a year 252 702 256 451 309 194 397 644
Wall earning, CZK a year 298 438 306 988 380 700 513 860
wagejobsh share of earnings on gross incomes, % 0.83 0.85 0.87 0.89
wr1 hourly wage rate of the head, CZK 94 95 121 187
wr2 hourly wage rate of the spouse, CZK 77 70 101 112
wr1sh share of heads earning money, % 0.84 0.93 0.87 0.92
wr2sh share of spuses earning money, % 0.42 0.48 0.52 0.56
BONUS_sh social allowances for children, CZK 4 158 4 725 4 377 5 428
TAX tax payments (PIT+SSC), CZK a year 65 138 61 818 91 755 151 909
HOURS hours spent on work 3 374 3 507 3 384 3 536
HOURS_sh time spent working, % 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.52
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while the last, fourth, group describes the households with the top 10% highest gross
earnings [reach].
Descriptive statistics for the four household groups dened by total gross earnings
is displayed in Table 4. Household composition in these groups varies more than in the
previous household classication based on ISCO-coded working professions. The higher
gross earnings the segment receives, the larger family, the more children and the more
economic active persons are in a family.
The net incomes, total gross earnings and expenditures on non-energy goods are also
increasing along the groups but with greater increase than in the ISCO-based groups.
Net incomes of poorare only a quarter of the rich, semi-poor gets about 38% of
what rich gets. Expenditures on energy also vary more than among the ISCO-groups;
poor, semi-poor and semi-reach spent 68%, 85% or 79%, respectively, of the
amount that is spent by richhouseholds on energy.
Gross earnings vary across the groups even more for total gross earnings; poor
and semi-poorearn only 16%, or 28%, respectively, of what did earn the rich, and
semi-reach still earn about a half of that only. These di¤erences are caused by two
factors. First, there are more persons in rich households who are working; especially the
shares of working spouses di¤er quite much, for example, there are only 10% and 28%
of working spouses in pooror semi-poor, respectively, while there are 77% working
spouses in the rich group. Second, the richer also earn larger hourly wages; while
on average the heads earned 63 CZK in poorgroup and 92 CZK in semi-poor, the
heads from richgroup received 229 CZK per hour, that is, 3.6 times more what the
poorearn. Job earnings are also contributing with higher share to total gross incomes
in the rich group; the share is 95% in richand only 74% in poorgroup. Poor also
worked less, about 47% of their time endowment, while rich spent 52% of their time at
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the four segments defined by total gross earnings.
richpoor=1
[with 10% lowest
earnings]
richpoor=2
[10% to 50%
lowest earnings]
richpoor=3
[50% to 90%
lowest earnings]
richpoor=4
[with 10%
highest earnings]
share share in the sample 0.10 0.40 0.40 0.10
OSOB household members 2.17 2.63 3.13 3.43
DETI number of children 0.58 0.73 0.84 0.76
EA number of economic active persons 1.05 1.37 2.00 2.48
CP_PRIJ net incomes, CZK a year 155 198 237 860 363 201 624 606
ENERGY energy expenditures, CZK a year 25 397 29 680 31 735 37 376
REST non-energy expenditures, CZK a year 129 801 208 180 331 466 587 229
Wall earning, CZK a year 127 735 222 951 415 426 801 793
wagejobsh share of earnings on gross incomes, % 0.74 0.80 0.91 0.95
wr1 hourly wage rate of the head, CZK 63 92 119 229
wr2 hourly wage rate of the spouse, CZK 60 69 84 127
wr1sh share of heads earning money, % 0.83 0.84 0.93 0.94
wr2sh share of spuses earning money, % 0.10 0.28 0.69 0.77
BONUS_sh social allowances for children, CZK 3 465 4 397 5 067 4 559
TAX tax payments (PIT+SSC), CZK a year 20 286 41 180 93 031 257 097
HOURS hours spent on work 1 987 2 572 4 067 5 174
HOURS_sh time spent working, % 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.52
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work. In absolute terms, the poor spent about 2,000 hours a year at work, while the
economic active persons from the rich households spent almost 5,200 hours at work.
4 Calibration of the parameters
4.1 The consumersutility function
For the purpose of calibration, we use nested CES utility functions to represent con-
sumerspreferences; we have,
U(x; y; Lj ; j) =

bjQj
 1
 + (1  bj)(1  Lj)  1
 
 1
; (11)
Qj =

ajx
! 1
! + (1  aj)y ! 1!
 !
! 1
: (12)
The above equations show that consumers have identical elasticities of substitution
between leisure and non-leisure goods, , and between energy and non-energy goods,
!. The value of these parameters has been chosen by help of very simple econometric
estimations and values found in the literature. Di¤erences in tastes are captured by the
parameters aj and bj . To estimate these parameters we follow the procedure already
used in Cremer and al. (2010) and (2013). Maximizing the j-type individual utility
function dened by (11) and (12) under the linearized budget constraint,
pxj + qyj = Gj +M j + wjnL
j ; (13)
where Gj is the income adjustment term (virtual income) needed for linearizing the bud-
get constraint and M j is the individuals exogenous income. The rst-order conditions
for a j-types optimization problem are,
1  aj
aj
 xj
yj
 1
! =
q
p
; (14)
(1  bj) xj=(1  Lj) 1
ajbj
h
aj + (1  aj)(xj=yj) 1 !!
i ! 
(1 !)
=
wjn
p
: (15)
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Using the observed values of x, y, p, q and wn and the value chosen for  and !, equations
(13)(15) allow to estimate the aj and the bj .
This calibration process has been used successively with the two data set described
above.
4.2 The producer
The technology of production is represented by a nested CES,
O = O (L;K;D) = B
h
(1  )L 1 +   1
i 
 1
; (16)
  = A
h
K
 1
 + (1  )D  1
i 
 1
; (17)
where A and B are constants,  and  represent the elasticities of substitution between
L and   and between K and D (given  ) respectively. Substituting (17) in (16) yields,
O = B
"
(1  )L 1 + A 1
h
K
 1
 + (1  )D  1
i ( 1)
( 1)
# 
 1
: (18)
Let w denotes the price of one unit of e¤ective labor, D denotes the tax on energy
input, and assume that there are no producer taxes on labor and capital.15 The rst-
order conditions for the rmsinput-hiring decisions are, assuming competitive markets,
OL(L;K;D) = w; (19)
OK(L;K;D) = r; (20)
OD(L;K;D) = pD + D: (21)
Using analytical expressions as derived from the nested CES form (18) for OL(L;K;D),
OK(L;K;D) and OD(L;K;D), the parameters , , A and B are the solution of the
system of equations (18)(21). The observed values of O, L, K, D , w, r and pD + D
used in this calibration process are from the EUKLEMS database (www.euklems.net).
15 It is not optimal to tax capital in this setting.
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4.2.1 Data summary and parameters
Table 5: Data summary and parameters
Low skilled
in services
Low Skilled
Crafts
Quite
Skilled
High
Skilled
(ISCO 1) (ISCO 2) (ISCO 3) (ISCO 4)
 10% 43% 32% 15%
I 298438 306988 380700 513860
px 30620 30079 30400 34853
qy 252702 256451 309194 397644
n 0:75945 0:81563 0:99956 1:9669
L 0:35560 0:34060 0:34466 0:35861
t 16% 16% 20% 24%
G  15371  11264  15290  27247
M 50022 41360 50650 70546
a 0:000289 0:000256 0:000133 0:000087
b 0:277479 0:259964 0:283205 0:324660
10%
lowest earnings
10% to 50%
lowest earnings
50% to 90%
lowest earnings
10%
highest earnings
(RP 1) (RP 2) (RP 3) (RP 4)
 10% 40% 40% 10%
I 127216 222159 412725 807451
px 25415 29316 31732 37262
qy 128279 206304 327500 587864
n 0:35080 0:60557 1:06638 2:00736
L 0:32817 0:33198 0:35023 0:36400
t 0:11774 0:14608 0:18794 0:25793
G  5453  8379  14408  51928
M 46910 54293 38484 77871
a 0:00179 0:00052 0:00013 0:00003
b 0:21929 0:24988 0:28678 0:36200
Type-independent gures
p = 1:11762 q = 1:00000  = 0:8  = 0:28697
 = 0:66490 ! = 0:26892  = 0:94848  = 0:52907
A = 1:58606 B = 1:98476
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5 Results
5.1 Linear commodity taxation
The results presented here are obtained for  = 0:5 (low inequality aversion index) and
 = 2 (high inequality aversion index). Two values of  have also been considered. The
rst value corresponds to the case in which there is no externality ( = 0), the second
is calculated in such a way that the rst best Pigouvian tax is equal to 10% of energy
price. Table 1 and 2 give the Pigouvian energy tax16 and the optimal linear energy tax
for the di¤erent values of  and . The upper part of the table has been obtained with
ISCO data (based on occupation of the head) while the lower part has been obtained
with RP data (i.e. reach-poor groups based on earnings). Remember that the polluting
input tax is strictly equal to the Pigouvian tax consequently, it is not reported in those
tables.
Table 6:
Optimal linear energy tax and Pigouvian tax with ISCO Data
First Best tax =0% First Best tax =10%
 = 0:5  = 2  = 0:5  = 2
Pigouvian tax 0:0 0:0 9:9 9:8
Optimal energy tax  6:9  9:6 2:3  0:6
Optimal linear energy tax and Pigouvian tax with RP Data
First Best tax =0% First Best tax =10%
 = 0:5  = 2  = 0:5  = 2
Pigouvian tax 0:0 0:0 8:8 10:2
Optimal energy tax  39:6  42:1  33:9  35:6
Our results show that the optimal linear energy tax is signicantly lower than the
Pigouvian tax. When there is no externality the tax is negative, that is energy should be
subsidized. Even with a negative externality (10% of price), energy must be subsidized
if the government care a lot about equity (for  = 2).
16Note that the Pigouvian tax reported in table 1 is generally not equal to 10%. This is because as
lump sum taxation is not feasible, we are in a second best world.
21
In the case of ISCO data, productivities di¤er among individuals but not as much
than with RP data where the rst category corresponds to the 10% poorest people in
the economy. This is why, the energy subsidy is signicantly higher with RP data.
5.2 Non-linear commodity taxation
We turn now to the case in which the government has the information it needs to
implement a non-linear energy tax. This is equivalent to say that a non-linear tari¤ of
energy is feasible. Let us note that the tari¤ is a non-separable function of the quantity
of energy consumed and the income. The implementation of such a tari¤ in practice is
not easy or impossible, even if individual transactions are fully observable. Indeed, it
need to mix two di¤erent sources of information: energy producers, which are holding
information on individual purchases, and government, holding information on individual
incomes. Note that among the technical di¢ culties that can be met for regrouping the
di¤erent information is the prohibition by law of such a process. Nevertheless, some
attempts to apply, or to approximate, such a system exist, a French project of electricity
pricing, currently abandoned, is an example. Another example comes from the Czech
Republic. To date, support of electricty generation from renewable resources in the
Czech Republic provided via a feed-in-tari¤s is nanced through a (linear) fee levied on
each kWh consumed. Recently, a new governmental proposal suggests that this support
scheme is replaced by and increase in payment for a circuit breaker, i.e. the xed part
of electricity price. The new scheme would in fact imply a non-linear tari¤ scheme in
electricity pricing in the Czech Republic.17.
Table 3 show the optimal energy tax with and without externality and under the
di¤erent values of . We rst note that, in any case, the usual non-distortion at the top
rule applies. As nobody tries to mimic the high income individuals, there is no need to
distort their behavior. Second, the results from ISCO data and RP data are contrasted.
17The issue of social tari¤s for electricity is analyzed in Crampes and al. (2014).
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Qualitatively speaking, our results are similar to the one obtained in our previous studies
for France 18. The subsidy does not change monotonically with income. This is because
individuals 1 and 2 try to mimic each other. Not only adjacent self selection constraints
are binding. The pattern is the following: 1 mimics 2, 2 mimics 1, 3mimics 4 and 4
mimics 2.
With ISCO data, individuals are segmented more with respect to their tastes than
with respect to their productivities. As we are mainly concerned by the impact of
energy taxes on income redistribution the segmentation used in RP data is much more
appropriated. But such a data base can be produced only with individual data that
was not available in our previous studies. We show in table 7 that, with RP data, the
energy subsidy (the optimal tax is always negative) is decreasing with income.
Table 7:
Optimal non-linear energy tax with ISCO Data
FB tax =0%
Types ISCO1 ISCO2 ISCO3 ISCO4
Optimal energy tax when  = 0:5  2:8  8:8  6:2 0:0
Optimal energy tax when  = 2  6:6  11:8  8:3 0:0
FB tax =10%
Types ISCO1 ISCO2 ISCO3 ISCO4
Optimal energy tax when  = 0:5 6:7 0:3 3:1 9:9
Optimal energy tax when  = 2 2:6  2:9 0:8 9:8
Optimal non-linear energy tax with RP Data
FB tax =0%
Types RP1 RP2 RP3 RP4
Optimal energy tax when  = 0:5  53:0  38:7  20:5 0:0
Optimal energy tax when  = 2  51:2  41:1  23:0 0:0
FB tax =10%
Types RP1 RP2 RP3 RP4
Optimal energy tax when  = 0:5  48:4  32:9  13:3 8:8
Optimal energy tax when  = 2  45:2  34:5  14:9 10:2
18See for instance Cremer and al. (2003).
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6 Conclusion
This paper has explored the design of an optimal general income tax system when earn-
ing abilities are endogenous, and when energy is used both as a polluting consumption
good and a polluting input. The paper has shown that the optimal tax on energy inputs
is Pigouvian and equal to its marginal social damage. The optimal tax on the consump-
tion of energy, on the other hand, is less than its marginal social damage. In fact, energy
consumption should be subsidized, the case in which the environmental cost of energy
consumption is su¢ ciently high being an exception. The reason for this is the fact that
the poor spend proportionally more of their income on energy consumption than the
rich.
The case of a non-linear tax on energy is particularly interesting because it usefully
completes the results of our previous studies. The households segmentation by ISCO
codes is comparable to the segmentation of our previous studies and the corresponding
results are also very similar (qualitatively speaking) to the one obtained for US and
France. This is not the case when the householdssegmentation is based on total gross
earnings. Indeed we show that in this case the subsidy must decrease with income.
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